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Victims' Justice? Reflections on an Internship at the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
D. James Bjorkman*
Here's an exercise: imagine that you are on the executive committee of a
political party. Consider what you would do if the youth wing of that party (such
as the Teen Age Republicans) began brutally killing people. Assume that these
killings are only against one ethnicity, a privileged minority. Then imagine that
youth wings of all other political parties start using the name of your youth wing
and join in the killing. You meet with the leaders of the youth group and order
them to stop the killing. They stop, but only for a few hours before beginning
again with new zeal. The killings become so rampant that there is no centralized
authority and no structure to order a stop to the killings. The youth groups now
coalesce with military groups and together they expand the killing to include
anyone protecting their targets and anyone opposing the killings. What could you
do, knowing that there was no way to stop the killing and that any attempt would
risk your life and those of your family members, friends, and colleagues?
Now imagine that you survive these atrocities only to lose the country to
invading rebels. You are exiled, arrested, and spend five years in jail before a
trial is begun. Over the next two years, the prosecutors amend the indictment and
restart the trial twice. You have now been in jail for ten years and your trial is
expected to finish, at the earliest, in two more years. Now consider that you're
being tried under theories of responsibility that did not exist at the times of the
killing. Due to the breadth of these theories, you will almost certainly be
convicted, and the same international community who dragged its feet when it
could have helped to stop the killing, says (through these theories of




Rwanda has 3 major ethnicities: the Hutu, the Tutsi, and the Twa.3 The Hutu
are the overwhelming majority comprising roughly 85% of the population, with
* J.D., University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law, to be conferred 2008. Many thanks to Peter
Robinson, Tara Long, Michael Kalisa, Jay Porter, Professor Linda Carter, and especially to Joseph Nzirorera for
letting me share his story.
1. http://www.teenagerepublicans.org.
2. Interview with Joseph Nzirorera, Prisoner in Rwanda (June 19, 2007).
3. Encyclopedia Britannica Online, Rwanda: Ethnic Composition (2008), http://www.britannica.com/
eb/article-4076I/Rwanda (last visited Jan. 28, 2008).
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the Tutsi and Twa making up roughly 14% and 1%, respectively.4 Despite being
a mino'rity, the Tutsis held political power in the form of a monarchy for several
centuries before and even during the European colonial period.5 The Tutsis
oppressed the Hutus and "reduced the Hutu to virtual serfdom" by not providing
them with a voice in the government and by withholding opportunities for socio-
6economic advancement. Tensions between the Hutus and Tutsis grew during the
early 20th century and came to a head between 1959 and 1964.' These tensions
culminated in a UN referendum by which the monarchy was abolished and the
PARMEHUTU (Party of the Hutu Emancipation Movement) gained power with
an overwhelming victory.8 Under Hutu rule, the oppression was reversed and by
1964, over 150,000 Tutsis were displaced to neighboring countries.9 Over the
next thirty years, the exiled Tutsis organized themselves and began preparing for
a revolution.'°
In 1973, Major General Juvfnal Habyarimana, a Hutu, became president."
He abolished all political activity (including political parties) and dissolved the
legislature. 2 In 1975, Habyarimana established the National Revolutionary
Movement for Development (MRND),
3 a party whose primary goal was unity.
14
For the next seventeen years, Rwanda existed as a single-party system. 5 Initially,
ethnic tensions diminished 16 as President Habyarimana appointed many Tutsis to
high-level positions in his government. 7 However, the exiled Tutsis formed the
Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) and on October 1, 1990, the RPF began attacking
the Rwandan army from their base in Uganda. 8
Conflicts continued until a ceasefire was signed on July 31, 1992." Part of
the ceasefire agreement created a timetable for returning to a multi-party system
where political parties (including the RPF) would share power on a proportional
4. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, BACKGROUND NOTE: RWANDA (2007), available at http://www.
state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2861 .htm.
5. Id.
6. Id.; Interview with Joseph Nzirorera, Prisoner in Rwanda (June 19, 2007), in which Nzirorera told me
that the "Hutus were treated like slaves under Tutsi rule".
7. Id.; Encyclopedia Britannica Online, Rwanda: History (2008), http://www.britannica.comeb/article-
214507/Rwanda (last visited Jan. 28, 2008).
8. Id.; U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, supra note 4.
9. Encyclopedia Britannica Online, supra note 7.
10. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, supra note 4.
11. Encyclopedia Britannica Online, supra note 7.
12. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, supra note 4.
13. Id.
14. Id.; Interview with Joseph Nzirorera, Prisoner in Rwanda (June 19, 2007).
15. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, supra note 4.
16. Interview with Joseph Nzirorera, Prisoner in Rwanda (June 19, 2007).
17. Id.
18. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, supra note 4; Encyclopedia Britannica Online, supra note 7.
19. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, supra note 4.
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basis.2° The Rwandan people immediately took to the multi-party system by
supporting five major political parties, including the MRND and RPF.2 Each of
these parties also created a youth wing to help with campaigning, most notably
the Interahamwe of the MRND.22 In April 1992, these five parties agreed to the
form of a transitional government.23 Before the agreement could come into effect,
there were many disagreements about the details, mainly because several of the
parties split into moderate and extremist factions and each of these factions
claimed rights to the legislative seats and powers for the entire party granted by
the ceasefire agreement. 4
On the night of April 6, 1994, President Habyarimana was returning from
Tanzania when his plane was shot down.25 Also on board were the Rwandan
army's chief of staff and President Ntaryamira of Burundi (another Hutu). 6 The
general assumption is that extremist Hutus killed the president because he was an
obstacle to the extermination of the Tutsis. 7 Others, however, believe that the
RPF shot down the plane to throw the Rwandan army into disarray in order to
complete a total victory over the whole of Rwanda. 8 Unfortunately, no
conclusive evidence on this subject has yet come to light.
Regardless of who shot down the plane or why, military and youth groups
(such as the Interahamwe) began killing Tutsi government leaders. 9 The killing
quickly spread to all Tutsis, moderate Hutus, and Hutus protecting Tutsis.30 The
RPF agreed to maintain the ceasefire for one day while the United Nations
Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) tried to stop the killings.3' Once it
became clear that UNAMIR could not stop the killing, the RPF moved across
Rwanda's northern border from Uganda32 and over the course of three months,
swept in a sickle- shaped movement across the east and then to southern and
western areas of Rwanda. 3  Eventually, the RPF surrounded the capitol of Kigali,
and the only other remaining government army stronghold was in the far
northwestern region.34 As the RPF advanced, the government army became
20. Id.; Encyclopedia Britannica Online, supra note 7.
21. Interview with Joseph Nzirorera, Prisoner in Rwanda (June 19, 2007).
22. Id.
23. Id
24. Id.; ROMtO DALLAIRE & BRENT BEARDSLEY, SHAKE HANDS WITH THE DEVIL 134 (2003).
25. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, supra note 4; Encyclopedia Britannica Online, supra note 7;
DALLAIRE, supra note 24 at 221.
26. Encyclopedia Britannica Online, supra note 7.; DALLAIRE, supra note 24, at 223-224.
27. Encyclopedia Britannica Online, supra note 7.
28. BBC News, Rwanda Takes French Radio OffAir, Nov. 27, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/
africa/6188550.stm (last visited Jan. 28, 2008).
29. DALLAIRE, supra note 24, at 231-233.
30. Id. at 232, 253-54.
31. Id. at 247.
32. Id. at 269.
33. Id. at 287-88.
34. Id. at 356, 378.
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frenzied and the killings of Tutsis intensified.3" The militias and the youth groups
(all calling themselves "Interahamwe" by now, regardless of their original group)
also escalated their killings. 36 It is commonly asserted that many of RPF also
committed genocide and war crimes in reprisal for the anti-Tutsi genocide.37 One
hundred days later, when the killing was over and the RPF controlled the whole
of Rwanda, 800,000 Rwandans were dead,38 1,750,000 were refugees, 9 and the
survivors (not to mention the international community) wanted to hold someone
accountable.4 0 Towards that end, the UN set up the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda ("ICTR" or simply "the tribunal") in November of 1994.4'
B. Judicial Structure
In Rwanda, alleged criminals are classified into different categories based on
the severity of the crimes of which they are accused. Specifically, category 1
includes the organizers and supervisors of the genocide, those who killed with
"zeal" or excessive wickedness" as well as rapists.43 Category 2 includes
"authors, co-authors, [and] accomplices of deliberate homicides as well as those
who committed attacks without the intent to kill."4 Category 3 is reserved for
those who committed offenses against property only.45 Categories 2 and 3 are
sent to gacaca, a unique set of local courts without many normal formalities such
as lawyers, pleadings, typical rules of evidence, etc.4 6 Most of the accused from
category 1 are sent to the standard national court system in Rwanda. 7 Only the
upper echelon of leaders and instigators (roughly 70 total48) were sent to the
tribunal. 9 While the differences in structures, procedure, and jurisprudence
between these three systems (which try people for the same basic crimes) would
35. Id. at 277.
36. Id.
37. UNITED NATIONS OFFICE FOR THE COORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS, RWANDA:
PROSECUTOR REVIEWS ALLEGED RPF GENOCIDE CRIMES, (Feb. 23, 2006) available at http://www.relief
web.int/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/DPAS-6MAF46?OpenDocument; DALLAIRE, supra note 24, at 378.
38. Linda E. Carter, "Justice and Reconciliation on Trial: Gacaca Proceedings in Rwanda", Printed in
University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law, Summer Program at 387, Salzburg, Austria (2006).
39. Refugees International, Remembering Rwanda: RI Looks Back at Genocide and Failure to Intervene,
Mar. 19, 2004, http://www.refugeesinternational.org/content/article/detail/1570 (last visited Jan. 28, 2008).
40. See, e.g., U.N. Security Council Resolution 955 (Nov. 8, 1994).
41. Id.
42. National Service of Gacaca Jurisdictions, Context or Historical Background of Gacaca Courts,
http://www.inkiko-gacaca.gov.rw/En/Generaties.htm (last visited Jan. 28, 2008); see also Carter, supra note 41.
43. Id.
44. Id. Note that there were originally four categories but categories 2 and 3 were merged.
45. National Service of Gacaca Jurisdictions, supra note 45.
46. Carter, supra note 41 at 394.
47. Id.
48. United Nations International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Status of Cases, available at http://69.
94.11.53/ENGLISH/cases/status.htm.
49. Carter, supra note 41, at 394.
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provide for an interesting discussion, this article will focus solely solely on the
tribunal.50
C. The Tribunal's Jurisprudence
The statute of the United Nations International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda was established on November 8, 1994 by the U.N. Security Council,
within a few months after the end of the genocide.5 The statute defines the
punishable crimes and provides multiple forms of liability.52 Article 2 defines
genocide as "acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a
national, ethnic, racial or religious group, as such"53 and the punishable acts are
specifically listed, one of which is "killing members of the group.514 Conspiracy
to commit, incitement to commit, and attempting to commit genocide are also
punishable.5  Article 6 provides for individual responsibility 6 and command
responsibility 7 while explicitly disallowing defenses of executing orders from a
superior55 and of acting in the capacity of a government official. 9 The elements of
command responsibility are: (1) there existed a superior-subordinate relationship
between the superior and the perpetrator of the crime; (2) the superior knew or
had reason to know that the criminal act was about to be or had been committed;
and (3) the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to
prevent the criminal act or to punish the perpetrator thereof. It is not necessary
that the accused held a military position in order to be liable; a position as a
civilian superior can be sufficient. 6
Another form of liability is joint criminal enterprise (JCE). Although it is not
explicitly created by the statute, the Appeals Chamber recognized the theory
50. It is also important to note that the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and
the Rwandan tribunal share the same Appeals Chamber, whose decisions are binding on both tribunals. See,
.e.g., http://www.un.org/icty/pressreal/p621-e.htm.
51. U.N. Security Council Resolution 955, Nov. 8, 1994.
52. Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda [hereinafter "ICTR"], available at
http://69.94.11.53/ENGLISH/basicdocs/statute.html.
53. Id., art. 2(2).
54. Id., art. 2(2)(a).
55. Id., art. 2(3).
56. Id., art. 6(l).
57. Id., art. 6(3).
58. Id., art. 6(4).
59. Id., art. 6(2).
60. Prosecutor v. Blagojevic & Jokic, No. IT-02-60-T, Judgement (Jan. 17, 2005) at 790; Prosecutor v.
Kordic & Cerkez, No. IT-65-14/2-A, Judgement (Dec. 17, 2004) at 827; Prosecutor v. Halilovic, No. IT-01-
48-T, Judgement (Nov. 16, 2005) at 56; Prosecutor v. Limaj et al, No. IT-03-66-T, Judgement (Nov. 30, 2005)
at 520; Prosecutor v. Oric, No. IT-03-68-T, Judgement (June 30, 2006) at 294.
61. Prosecutor v. Delalic, No. IT-96-2 1-A, Judgement (Feb. 20, 2001) at IN 195-196; Prosecutor v. Prlic
et al, No. IT-04-74-PT, Decision to Dismiss the Preliminary Objections Against the Tribunal's Jurisdiction
(Sept. 26, 2005) at 19; Prosecutor v. Oric, No. IT-03-68-T, Judgement (June 30, 2006) at 308; Prosecutor v.
Aleskosvski, No IT-95-14/1-T, Judgement (Mar. 24, 2000) at 70.
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under the Individual Criminal Responsibility Article of the tribunal's statute.62
Under this theory, one may be held liable for the illegal actions of another if both
parties (with or without more parties) formed an agreement to effect the illegal
purpose.63 The systemic form of JCE is utilized when there is an organized
criminal system (such as concentration camps) and "requires personal knowledge
of the organized system and intent to further the criminal purpose of the
system." 6
Once an accused is found to be a member of a JCE, they may also be held
accountable for acts which may not have been directly connected to the purpose
of the enterprise but which were a "natural and foreseeable consequence" of the
common purpose.65 In this case, the "accused must know that such a crime might
be perpetrated and willingly take the risk that the crime might occur by joining or
continuing to participate in the enterprise." 66 It is not necessary that the principal
perpetrator of a crime be a member of the JCE so long as the perpetrator acted in
accordance with the common purpose of the JCE.67 Where the principal
perpetrator is not a member of the JCE, it must be established that the crime can
be imputed to a member and that this member acted in accordance with the
common plan.6 There is no requirement that the accused have an agreement with
the principal perpetrator in order to be liable under JCE.69 However, the
perpetrator's crime must have formed part of the criminal purpose of the JCE.7 °
JCE is differentiated from aiding and abetting in that one must share the common
intent for JCE, while to be an aider and abettor, one must merely have knowledge
of the perpetrators' intent and lend them support which had a significant effect on
the perpetration of the crime."
II. PERSPECTIVES
At this point, I would like to disclose my two biases. First, I arrived in Africa
assuming that the prosecution had compiled evidence, strong and irrefutable
enough to convict each accused, long before issuing the indictments. This first
bias was quickly overturned by my experience of listening to the trial and reading
past transcripts. My second bias is that I worked on the defense team for Joseph
62. Prosecutor v. Kvocka, IT-98-30/I-A, Judgment (Feb. 28, 2005) at 79. Note that the Kvocka court's
holding is based on Article 7(1) of the Yugoslavian tribunal's statute; the equivalent article in the Rwandan
tribunal is Article 6(1).
63. Prosecutor v. Kvocka, IT-98-30/1-A, Judgment (Feb. 28 2005) at 82.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 83 & 86.
66. Id. at 83.
67. Prosecutor v. Brdjanin, No. IT-99-36-A, Judgment (Apr. 3, 2007) at 413.
68. Id. at 1 430.
69. Id. at 415.
70. Id. at 418.
71. Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, No. IT-97-25, Judgement (Sept. 17, 2003) at 122.
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Nzirorera in the case of Karamera, et al. during my externship at the ICTR. The
remainder of this paper is based heavily on my perceptions as well as those of
two other interns (Tara Long, who also worked on the Nzirorera defense team,
and Jay Porter, from the judges' chambers) and Michael Kalisa, a Rwandan
attorney who worked for the Registry.
In order to analyze the success of the tribunal, we must consider the
objectives which the tribunal seeks to meet. A few potential goals are truth
(creating an accurate historical record of the genocide), justice (punishing the
actual wrongdoers), and reconciliation of the ethnic groups.
A. The Statute
It is hard for me to believe that the tribunal's goals are truth, justice, or
reconciliation because several factors led me to believe that defendants were
railroaded despite the statement in the tribunal's statute which provides that "the
accused shall be innocent until proven guilty. 72 For example, the full title of the
tribunal is "The International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons
Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International
Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens
responsible for genocide and other such violations committed in the territory of
neighbouring States, between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 1994." 7 This
title itself implies that the accused are already convicted. Furthermore, the
tribunal's jurisprudence provides for such a broad range of theories of liability
(specifically JCE) that it is nearly impossible to escape punishment.
Although the tribunal creates jurisdiction for anyone who committed
genocide or other war crimes in Rwanda in 1994, to date, no member of the RPF
has been indicted by the tribunal. On a similar note, one of the accused, Jean-
Bosco Barayagwiza was arrested and held for seven months without being
charged.77 The Appeals Chamber held that this violated the accused's right to be
promptly charged. 78 The Rwandan government was upset by this decision and
suspended cooperation with the tribunal. 79 Because an overwhelming majority of
the witnesses travel from Rwanda, this would have effectively prevented the
tribunal from continuing its prosecutions. 0 Under this pressure, the Appeals
Chamber quickly changed course and reversed its previous decision by allowing
72. Art. 20(3) of the ICTR Statute, available at http://69.94.11.53/ENGLISH/basicdocs/statute.html.
73. Preamble of the ICTR Statute, available at http://69.94.11.53/ENGLISH/basicdocs/statute.html)
(change in capitalization pattern in the original).
77. ICTR, Decision: Jean Bosco Barayagwiza v. The Prosecutor, available at http://69.94.11.53/
ENGLISH/cases/Barayagwiza/decisions/dcs991103.htm at 100.
78. Id.
79. Christopher Wren, U.N. Tribunal Wrong to Free Top Suspect, Rwanda Says, NY TIMES, Nov. 12,
1999 at All, available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9407E5D9163DF93IA25752CIA96
F958260.
80. Id.
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Barayagwiza's prosecution to proceed despite the violation of his rights.8 '
There are further inadequacies in the statute. For example, consider that the
statute does not provide for the treatment of acquitted persons. On the last day of
my internship at the tribunal in July 2007, my supervisor, Peter Robinson,
arranged for our team to have lunch with Andre Ntagerura, the first former
minister to be acquitted by the tribunal 2 and one of only five people acquitted by
the tribunal to date.83 He was arrested on March 27, 19964 and acquitted by the
trial chamber on February 25, 2004,85 which was upheld by the appeals chamber
on July 7, 2006.86 Since his release in early 2004, Mr. Ntagerura has been living
in a UN-protected safe house near the tribunal with other acquitted persons. For
his own security, he normally does not go anywhere except for his house and the
tribunal, and primarily travels between these two locations by guarded UN
transport. While at the tribunal, he spends most of his time in the library using
the internet. He has only seen his wife twice since his arrest in early 1996. His
home country of Rwanda will not welcome him back nor issue him a passport,
and because he has no passport, no other country will allow him entry. Although
Mr. Ntagerura lives in Arusha, Tanzania, he is truly country-less. Had the
drafters of the statute considered the potential of an acquittal, they may have
drafted a solution to this situation.
B. The Witnesses
During my internship, I noticed a pattern emerge in the prosecution's
witnesses. Each witness would use a pseudonym for their protection as allowed
under the rules, 7 and the prosecution would then lead the witness through a
detailed account of what they claimed to have seen first hand. This would usually
be compelling evidence against the accused persons, but most witnesses
significantly changed their stories once the cross-examination began. These
witnesses would claim that they did not actually witness the accused acting as
they had just described but, rather, that they heard from a friend or family
member that the accused was performing the said act. Many would have also
81. ICTR, Decision: Jean Bosco Barayagwiza v. The Prosecutor at 71, available at http://69.94.
11.53/ENGLISH/cases/Barayagwiza/decisions/dcs991103.htm.
82. BBC News, Rwanda Genocide Court Frees Pair, Feb. 8, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/
4693640.stm (last visited Jan. 28, 2008).
83. ICTR Homepage, http://69.94.11.53/default.htm. For reference, twenty-seven people have been
convicted (appeals process completed), two more have been convicted but are currently appealing, the trials of
twenty-eight are still in process, the trials of six people have not yet begun, sixteen others are still at large, and
the indictments of two others were withdrawn.
84. ICTR, Prosecutor v. Andr6 Ntagerura, Emmanuel Bagambiki, and Samuel Imanishimwe, Case No.
ICTR-99-46-T, available at http://69.94.11.53/ENGLISH/cases/Imanishimwe/judgement/judgment-en.pdf at 6.
85. Id.
86. ICTR, The Prosecutor v. Andr6 Ntagerura, Emmanuel Bagambiki, Samuel Imanishimwe, Case No.
ICTR-99-46-A, available at http://69.94.11.53/ENGLISH/cases/Ntagerura/judgement/060707.pdf.
87. ICTR Rule of Procedure and Evidence 75(A).
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previously testified in another proceeding with contradictory statements. In fact,
during Tara Long's internship on the Nzirorera team, one witness admitted on the
stand that he had been untruthful in previous trials and that if he remained
consistent in this trial, that he would be lying and that his conscience prevented
him from continuing this deception.8 s Long observed that because an
overwhelming majority of the evidence used to convict is provided in witness
testimony, the prosecution's evidence is weak and unreliable; "they need more
proof' for a fair conviction. 9 With regards to a goal of creating an accurate
historical record, only one side of the story is being told by the witnesses, and it
is difficult to rebut their accusations because of their anonymity." 9 To be fair, I
did observe one witness who testified under his own name, but he also admitted
on the stand that he had no personal knowledge of any culpable acts committed
by the the three defendants in the case. In sum, the practice of allowing
anonymous witnesses, although well-intentioned, all but completely removes
deterrence from making false statements, and this is not consistent with the goals
of truth, justice, or reconciliation. 9'
C. Other Factors
Despite my personal biases, there are people with more objective per-
spectives who share my views. For example, Jay Porter, an intern from the
judges' chambers, observed that the "deck is stacked against the accused at the
[tribunal] ... On several occasions, the court has exhibited an apparent bias
toward the prosecution. The budget for the Office of the Prosecutor is several
times the allocated budget for the Defense Office. The prosecution enjoys
cooperation from the Rwandan government, while defense investigators often
complain of challenges while searching for evidence in Rwanda. Witnesses have
openly expressed their intent in court to prosecute the defendants, while the
defense is often left to rebut accusations with [the testimony of] close friends and
family members because of the potential consequences of testifying on behalf of
the accused... The defendants had an uphill battle. They were deprived of tools
that may have allowed them to bring truth before the court. I find this outrageous.
What an irony to think that the international community may be actively pursuing
a similar cause as the genocidaire: removing individuals from society who have
not committed a justifying crime. After all, if by machete or by a seven-year
internationally coordinated proceeding, what is the difference if they both result
88. Trial Transcript from July 6, 2006 at 24 (on file with author). See also ICTR, Minutes of
Proceedings: Karemera et al., available at http://69.94.11.53/ENGLISH/cases/Karemera/minutes/2006/78-
060706.pdf at 1 (g).
89. Interview with Tara Long (Oct. 10, 2007).
90. Id.
91. For an in-depth analysis of this point, see Joanna Pozen, "Justice Obscured: The Non-Disclosure of
Witnesses' Identities in ICTR Trials," 38 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 281 (Fall/Winter 2005-06).
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in the individual being stripped of his life and liberty? Granted, comparing the
commission of genocide to life imprisonment is not entirely fair, but can we
really call one crime and the other justice if both are merely controlled by
political whims?... I cannot honestly say that I believe the ICTR is 100%
interested in truth. Nor can I honestly say that any international tribunal has been
set up without political motives that underlie its mission to administer justice and
inherently tip the balance of fair proceedings in favor of prosecution."92
Specifically considering a goal of reconciliation, Rwanda set up a National
Unity and Reconciliation Commission which strives for "a peaceful, united and
prosperous nation."93 One observer noted that
"Rwandans want, above all, to find out exactly where and how those
close to them died. Without this knowledge, it is hard to move on.
Genocide memorials have been erected throughout the country in the
solemn style of our Vietnam Veterans Memorial, only the slates are
largely blank, listirg hundreds of names of the known dead but leaving
space for tens of thousands of others who perished and whose names are
unknown. The need to learn the names of the dead is greater than the
need to punish."
There is conflicting evidence of whether reconciliation is actually taking
place. For example, Michael Kalisa, a Rwandan lawyer at the tribunal, told me
that everybody knows their own ethnicity as well as that of their neighbors and
friends, but that many times it is difficult to ascertain the ethnicity of stranger.95
This can be attributed to the proliferation of interethnic relationships. 9 Kalisa
went on to tell me that although this subject is still somewhat on the forefront,
discussion of ethnicity is diminishing, and he predicts that his grandchildren will
probably not know their ethnicity.97 However, many Rwandans still see a sharp
divide between the Hutus and the Tutsi.
III. CONCLUSION
I wish to make clear that what happened in Rwanda was horrible. The
international community should work to ensure that this type of slaughter never
happens again. I do not make any jurisdictional challenges like the defendants at
92. Barry Scholl, I Could Defend a War Criminal: A Quinney College Student Reflects on his
Experiences as a Legal Intern at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Aug. 27, 2007, http://old2.
law.utah.edu/NEWS/displayArticle.asp?newslD=34.
93. National Unity and Reconciliation Commission, http://www.nurc.gov.rw/index.php?MisViv.
94. Sarel Kandell Kromer, The Rwandan Reconciliation, WASH. POST, Oct 15, 2005, at B2, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/10/15/AR2005101500108.html.
95. Interview with Michael Kalisa (Oct. 10, 2007).
96. Id.
97. Id.
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Nuremburg did; nor do I argue that the tribunal lacks the authority to try
individuals under international law for genocide or war crimes. Instead, my
argument is that the tribunal appears to be created to convict rather than try.
I return to the question posed above: is the tribunal successful? This question
is answered differently differently depending on one's perspective. Returning to
Michael Kalisa's comments, the system could be considered a success from a
security standpoint by removing an undesirable element from society. 9' From a
cultural perspective, it is difficult for laypeople to understand why there are still
so many alleged genocidaires who are still on trial more than thirteen years after
the killings took place.99 But more importantly, the tribunal does not seem to
serve any legitimate goals-such as truth, justice, or reconciliation.
Because the tribunal is convicting most of the accused based on broad
theories of responsibility, the tribunal seems to be administering victors' justice.
This may be an accurate term for the trials in the Rwandan national courts or the
gacaca courts, because the invading RPF won the war and controlled Rwanda
when the category system was instituted. However, the tribunal doesn't fit the
typical mold of victor's justice, because it is not pandering to the interests of a
conquering nation. Instead, it seems that the international community was
attempting to clear its conscience when drafting the tribunal's statute. Under
these circumstances, rules and theories of responsibility were created, which
allow the victims to convict virtually anyone they please, such as Joseph
Nzirorera-"victims' justice". It is my opinion that while the international
community needed to respond to the atrocities of the Rwandan genocide but the
response turned out to be disproportional and ill-suited. I hope that the new set of
ad-hoc tribunals and the permanent International Criminal Court will learn from
the mistakes of the ICTR and avoid the pitfalls of victims' justice.
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